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Abstract: The British withdrawal of 1968 is seen as the end of British 
influence and involvement in the Persian Gulf. Seeing how their presence in 
the Gulf was vital to the security and stability of the region, one is left with 
questions to why the region continued to remain stable after the 
withdrawal. Literature brings into discussion a transition from British to 
American influence in the region. However, it can be argued that this 
answer is somewhat unsatisfactory. Thus, this study investigates the role 
played by Her Majesty‟s Government in the conception and maintenance of 
a security construct for the Persian Gulf, based on the „Pax Britannica‟ 
model, which filed the British void between 1968 and 1980.  
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Introduction 
 
“America is worse than Britain, Britain is worse than 
America, The Soviet Union is worse than both”1. 
 
According to former diplomat Christopher Rundle, those words 
were graffiti on the walls of the British Embassy in Teheran during the 
events of the Islamic Revolution
2
. To someone who is not familiar with the 
Islamic Revolution, this paradoxical message rather indicates confusion in 
                                                             
* Andrei Brumă is an MA Student in International Relation and International Studies at 
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1 Cristopher Rundle, “Iran-United Kingdom Relations Since the Revolution: Opening 
Doors”, in Anousharavan Ehtushami, Zweiri Mahjoob (eds), Iran‟s Foreign Policy from 
Khatami to Ahmadinejad, Reading, Ithaca Press, 2008,  p. 89. 
2 Ibidem. 
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the minds of the revolutionaries than insight in the forces that were 
responsible for the turbulent events of those days.   
The inclusion of the United States of America and the USSR in the 
message left on the British Embassy‟s wall was quite understandable, as 
both represented the most visible and powerful external forces that were 
seen as trying to subvert Iran to keep or bring it in its sphere of influence. 
The inclusion of Britain however presents somewhat of a mystery. The 
location of the message signifies that it was left for Her Majesty‟s 
Government, but neither Britain nor the British Embassy in Teheran was 
the prime target in any of the following events. Was it confusion or a reflex 
of old times? 
Although a case can be made that centuries of British control over 
the Persian Gulf may not have contributed to lots of trust between Iranians 
and the British, this does not explain why the struggle against the Iranian 
monarch and the subsequent revolutionary actions would necessarily spill 
towards the United Kingdom, as the facts place the United States at the 
centre of most events. Also, the literature focuses almost entirely on the role 
of the US. 
Surely, the unprecedented events in the United States‟ Embassy in 
Tehran, known as the Hostage Crisis, can be held responsible for the 
abundance of attention for the role of the US. But, the security construct for 
the Persian Gulf that replaced the „Pax Britannica‟ as of 1968 was clearly 
Anglo-American by design and Britain was assigned with an important role 
in it, suggesting a much more prominent role than generally perceived.   
This study therefore aims to answer the question: „what is the role 
of the United Kingdom in the Security Construct for the Persian Gulf and 
what impact did it have on its international position?‟ 
The results may also contribute to a better understanding of the 
present situation, as the context set by the Islamic Revolution still dictates 
the relation between Iran and the West. The tension between Iran and the 
West at the birth of the Islamic Republic may in part explain why the 
process of bridging the gap between the two is so difficult and why any 
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major development is, at the same time, saluted but also viewed with 
mistrust.  
 
The Security Construct for the Persian Gulf 
 
As of 1968, a Security Construct of Anglo-American design was 
developed for the Persian Gulf, replacing the „Pax Britannica‟ as described 
in Chapter 5. According to Fain it was designed to maintain stability in the 
region and to prevent the USSR to expand its influence in the Persian Gulf
3
. 
Obviously, the economic importance of the oil rich Persian Gulf was a 
strong motivation for the West to secure stability in the region. With Iran 
and Saudi Arabia as sworn enemies and an unstable Iraq, stability was all 
but natural. At the same time, the security construct could serve as part of a 
Middle East „front‟ in the Cold War with the USSR.   
Again according to Fain, the security construct was built on 4 fundamental 
pillars developed by American strategists, as follows: 
 Maintain British influence in the Persian Gulf for as long as 
possible.  
 Resolve the differences between the two  largest and most powerful 
actors in the region (Saudi Arabia and Iran); 
 Support better economic and political cooperation between the 
Persian Gulf states; 
 Avoid any military build ups by the Gulf‟s littoral states4. 
As presented by Fain the construct was based on a framework that was 
to encourage the regional actors to cooperate and resolve their disputes so 
that any possible conflict could be resolved through political action. British 
influence was seen as essential for this strategy to work.  
                                                             
3 Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region, New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 178. 
4 Ibidem. 
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However, due to the withdrawal of the Britain troops, the United Kingdom 
lacked the directly available military power to solve crises in the region.  As 
a consequence, a regional arbiter was required that had to be made strong 
enough to discourage any conflict in the area, as Hurewitz argues
5
, but that 
at the same time could be sufficiently controlled.  The logical choice for 
this role was Iran, where at that time the pro-western Shah was 
consolidating his position, making Iran a reliable ally for the West.  
Consequently, Iran needed to be supplied with sophisticated 
weapons systems to be provided by the US and its allies. In the eyes of the 
United States, the security construct was of such importance that it took 
major steps to substantiate it.  
This is clearly demonstrated by the weapon systems that Iran had 
access to. As Stork and Paul argue, the US sold F-4 Phantom aircrafts 
(Israel being the only other state in the region that was in possession of this 
type of aircraft) to Iran in an effort to secure its place as the region arbitral
6
. 
Moreover, Alexander Moens states that from the Nixon administration 
onwards the US issued Iran with a “carte blanche”7 so that the Shah could 
acquire any weapon system he desired
8
. 
The importance of the security construct can also be demonstrated 
by the fact that it even overwrote some of the US foreign policy doctrines. 
Moens argued that the importance of Iran and the Shah as an ally and 
gendarme for the Persian Gulf surpassed the Carter Doctrine and multiple 
other US directives that forbade the sale of arms to states that violated 
human rights
9
. Even more so, President Carter, during his visit in 1977, 
                                                             
5 Jacob C. Hurewitz, “The Persian Gulf: British Withdrawal and Western Security”, in 
Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 401, 1972, p. 115. 
6 Joe Stork, James Paul, “Arms Sale and the Militarization of the Middle East”, in MERIP 
Reports, No. 37, 1983, pp. 5-6. 
7 Alexander Moens, “President Carter‟s Advisers and the Fall of the Shah”, in Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 2, 1991, p. 214. 
8 Ibidem. 
9 Ibidem, pp. 214-216. 
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openly showed support for the Shah
10
 even though it was a known fact that 
the Iranian regime was violating human rights.  
Summing up, the security construct that governed the Persian Gulf 
from 1968 to 1979 was envisioned to maintain political and economic 
stability and cooperation in the Persian Gulf and to prevent the spread of 
USSR influence within the region, mainly through the influence its 
initiators were supposed to have on the local parties in the region and 
through a strong and well-armed Iran to discourage any major conflict in 
the area.  
 
Britain’s Role in the Security Construct 
  
Britain‟s historical relation with the Persian Gulf is a well 
established and a highly analyzed fact between the scholars. Most notably, 
Uzi Rabi argues that because of the Persian Gulf‟s importance, the British 
installed a so called „Pax Britannica‟ in the region as early the XIX 
century
11
. Through this security construct, which gave complete autonomy 
to the regional states and only transferred control of the foreign policy to 
the British, the United Kingdom was able to maintain control of the Gulf‟s 
security with a relative small number of troops
12
. This construct was 
governed by the „Exclusive Treaties‟ of 1892 stating that the Gulf States:  
 Were forbidden to engage in any form of communication nor sign 
agreements with and other power except the British; 
 Were forbidden  to permit agents of foreign governments to take 
residence on their territory without prior British consent; 
                                                             
10 Eric Watkins, “The Unfolding US Policy in the Middle East”, in Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1, 1997, p. 8. 
11 Uzi Rabi, “Britain‟s „Special Position‟ in the Gulf: Its Origins, Dynamics and Legacy”, 
in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2006, pp. 353-354. 
12 Ibidem, p. 354. 
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 Were forbidden to alter their borders except in the case that the 
alteration was for the British government
13
. 
 Although the British hold on their foreign policies was very strong, 
this must not be understood as a colonial rule on the Persian Gulf states. 
According to Uzi Rabi, the British “kept out of [the] internal administration 
as far as possible”14 giving the states a “certain level of autonomy”15. 
Within this framework the British could intervene in disputes between the 
Persian states (usually concerning frontiers), an involvement that was 
generally welcomed and accepted by local rulers
16
.  
However, in 1968 this construct came to an end when the British announced 
their withdrawal from the East of Suez. The reasons for this decision are 
still being debated by academics. Some argue that the decision was dictated 
by domestic policy
17
, others argue that this move represented a reorientation 
of Britain‟s engagement within the international system from the „world‟ 
towards „Europe‟18. But unlike the differences in views about the 
underlying reasons, there is a general consensus about the fact that the 
withdrawal left a security void in the region.  
As the region undoubtedly was of strategic importance for the entire 
west, and as the United States on its own were unable to fill this void due to 
its involvement in Vietnam
19
, this situation presented a growing problem, 
especially when multiple attempts to convince the United Kingdom to 
reconsider their decision failed. According to Fain, the United States‟ 
pressure was such that it even created unprecedented friction between the 
                                                             
13 Ibidem. 
14 Ibidem. 
15 Ibidem. 
16 Ibidem, p. 355. 
17 Shohei Sato, “Britain‟s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964-68: A Pattern 
in the Puzzle”, in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2009, p. 
109. 
18 Conor D. M. McCourt, “What was Britain‟s „East of Suez Role?‟ Reassessing the 
Withdrawal”, in Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2009, p. 467. 
19 Taylor Fain, op. cit., p. 181. 
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two allies
20
. Ultimately, the solution was found in engaging Britain into the 
creation of the Security Construct as detailed in the previous chapter.  
The new Security Construct differed in design from the previous 
„Pax Britannica‟, most notably where the new Construct did not rely on the 
presence of any foreign troops and did not limit the Gulf States in their 
foreign policy anymore. British influence, however, was still defined as a 
cornerstone of the Construct. 
The British had, of course, an unmistakable „footprint‟ in the region, 
but they could not count anymore on a generally accepted role by all parties 
involved, as was demonstrated in Iraq.  Obviously, Britain was capable to 
use its influence to stimulate cooperation between the local actors and solve 
disputes (as described by Fain
21
), but, in the absence of British troops in the 
region, policing the states of the Persian Gulf and keeping peace was an 
impossibility. To give such a crucial role to Iran must have been based on 
the assessment that the West and the UK in particular would have enough 
influence on Iran to secure their goals. This, in fact, largely substitutes the 
question of Britain‟s influence in the region into the question of Britain‟s 
influence on Iran. 
 
Britain’s Influence on Iran  
 
The roots of British influence on Iran historically date back to 1622 
when the British helped the Persian to recover Hurmuz from the 
Portuguese
22
. The British extended their involvement in the XIX century 
and took control over the entire region including Iran
23
 with the 
establishment of their „Pax Britannica‟, as argued in the previous chapter.  
The discovery of oil in Iran deepened both the importance of and the 
British influence on Iran, especially after the foundation of the Anglo-
                                                             
20 Ibidem, p. 184. 
21 Ibidem, p. 178. 
22 Uzi Rabi, op. cit., p. 352. 
23 Ibidem, pp. 353-354. 
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Persian Oil Company (with British majority).  The British dominated the 
technology to refine oil
24
, making Iran dependent on their expertise.  
The importance of the Iranian oil reserves became very imminent 
during World War II when the Western allies feared that they could be cut 
off of supplies due to German influence on Reza Shah, who had declared 
Iran to remain neutral
25
. This, alongside the need to secure the 
transportation of arms to the USSR, was the main reasons for the 
occupation of Iran by British and Soviet troops
26
. After the war, this lead to 
a territorial dispute between Iran and the USSR, as the Soviets refused to 
withdraw their troops until they would receive similar oil concessions as the 
British and Americans already enjoyed
27
. With strong British and American 
support for Iran and pressure on the USSR, this crisis was solved and the 
Soviets withdrew their troops
28
. 
Even though British expertise was vital for Iran, in 1953 Mossadegh 
–the prime minister of Iran and popular leader–, made the decision to 
nationalize the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. This was not acceptable to the 
British
29
. In response the British, backed by the United States, launched a 
coup d‟état, removing Mossadegh, and putting the pro-western Shah in 
power
30
. This British-designed and executed move clearly demonstrated the 
extent of British influence at that time. It also explains the Britain‟s 
influence on the Shah, who, in the eyes of Iran‟s population, was even 
synonymous with the UK‟s man31. 
                                                             
24
 Ervand Abrahamian,, A Modern History of Iran, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008, p. 119. 
25 Steven R. Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces, Washington 
D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2009, pp. 152-153. 
26 Alethia H. Cook, Jalil Roshandel, The United States and Iran, New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009, p. 15 
27 Natalia I. Yegorova, “The „Iranian Crisis‟ of 1945-1946: A View from the Russian 
Archives”, in Cold War International History Project, Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson 
International Centre for Scholars, 1996, pp. 3-4. 
28 Steven R. Ward, op. cit., p. 183. 
29 Ervand Abrahamian, op. cit., p. 119. 
30 Ibidem, p. 99. 
31 Ibidem, p. 122. 
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The removal of the prime minister allowed the British to open new 
negotiations leading to the creation of a consortium as owners of Anglo-
Persian Oil Company.  British Petroleum was to own 40%
32
 seconded by 
the Anglo-Dutch Shell with 14%
33
, thus allowing the British to maintain 
control over the Iranian oil. In the years after, the consortium remained the 
largest oil producer in Iran
34
, thereby further consolidating British influence 
in Iran. 
British influence was also apparent in the formation of CENTO in 
1955. In this NATO-like organization meant to contain the Soviet Union, 
Britain was the only western power to participate as a member. Although 
CENTO never matured into an influential organization, it allowed the Shah 
to expand its military forces and buy sophisticated new military equipment 
from the west
35
, tying Iran technologically to the west.  
As until 1978 no major crisis within the region occurred, the validity 
of the Security Construct‟s assumptions were not really tested, making it 
more difficult to determine the level of British influence in the decade 
preceding the Islamic Revolution. But a growing number of (declassified) 
documents relating to events at the end of 1978 and 1979 reveal a 
fundamentally unchanged level of influence. Due to the limitations of the 
material these documents may not yet be seen as conclusive evidence, but 
they do establish its likeliness. 
The instability generated by the Islamic Revolution forced the 
British government into action in an attempt to solve the situation and bring 
back stability, preferably with the Shah still in power.  
In December 1978, just two months before the Shah would be 
forced to flee Iran, the British Foreign Office, in a discussion of the 
situation in Tehran on December 20
th
, mentions what resources the British 
                                                             
32 Peter Avery, Garvin R.G. Hambly, Charles Melville (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
Iran Volume 7 From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, p. 265. 
33 Ibidem, p. 665. 
34 Ibidem, p. 668. 
35 Steven R. Ward, op. cit., p. 192. 
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had on their disposal and what their intentions were. The summary of that 
meeting, reviewing the foreign policy towards Iran, gives an interesting 
insight into the extent of British influence: 
 
“Mr Judd pointed out that the British Ambassador was now 
labelled as a close adviser to the Shah and this would cause 
trouble for us. Mr Weir said that this should not necessarily 
prove harmful. Everyone knew we had relations with the 
Government, Armed Services and members of the 
opposition. Mr Judd stated that it was time we cooled down 
our relations with the Shah. Dr. Owen said that this had in 
fact probably already happened, but Sir Anthony Parsons 
[the British ambassador to Teheran] could not refuse to see 
the Shah when he asked for him”36.  
 
This extract from the meeting draws attention to two important factors:  
 First of all, the fact that the British ambassador is considered one of 
the Shah‟s closest advisers points towards a kind of influence that 
usually is not established overnight or customary for an ambassador. 
The references made to the Army and the Opposition also show at 
least an assumed level of influence that goes beyond the ordinary. 
Even if the perceived influence is overrated, as some theories 
suggest
37
, it seems likely that the relation between the two states 
greatly surpassed the relations that could be expected from a Britain 
which, as the McCourt argued, orientated away from its “Global 
Role”38. The open discussion on what can be done to “steer the Shah 
in the right direction”39 is fully in line with this.  
                                                             
36 FCO 08/3351, Internal Political Situation in Iran (Part A.), 1979, doc. W64. 
37 Iran and Britain, Documentary produced by Christopher de Bellaigue, United Kingdom, 
BBC Four, 2009.  
38 Conor D. M. McCourt, op. cit., p. 467. 
39 FCO 08/3351, Internal Political Situation in Iran (Part A.), 1979, doc. W64. 
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 Secondly, the British apparently had the option to follow multiple 
leads, to not rely on just their relation with the Shah. A further 
analysis of the archival documents generated by British activities in 
the months following this meeting show a clear and promising 
engagement between Her Majesty‟s Government and the Iranian 
opposition
40
. This clearly suggests that Britain was interested in and 
believed it was able to play a role even in an Iran without the Shah.  
Non-governmental officials seemed to have had the same perception.  
An internal letter from David Stephen, political adviser, addressed to the 
Private Secretary, gives us access to a broader understanding of British 
influence over Iran. Stephen considered: the “BBC Persian Service was 
universally regarded as the most reliable news source in Iran”41. This 
position clearly takes some time to establish. He adds that, although it may 
take a couple of years before the situation would stabilize, “The 
involvement of American and British technological and industrial expertise 
was such that no Government would wish to throw out the Anglo-American 
overnight”42.  
Mr. Stephen‟s analysis of the situation seems to fit well in the definition 
of smart power forwarded by Joseph Nye in his work The Future of Power, 
in which he argues that a state can influence another actor‟s decisions 
through the latter‟s dependence on values and expertise (soft power) in 
combination with the threat of losing those (hard power)
43
.  
It is safe to conclude that at least the British perceived the Security 
Construct‟s assumptions with regard to their level of influence on Iran as 
valid and a variety of available material suggests that this was not only the 
case in 1979,  but during the entire existence of the Security Construct.  
 
 
                                                             
40 Passim, FCO 08/3351, Internal Political Situation in Iran (Part A.), 1979. 
41 FCO 08/3351, Internal Political Situation in Iran (Part A.), 1979, doc. W64. 
42 Ibidem. 
43 Joseph Nye, The Future of Power, New York, Public Affairs, 2011, pp. 207-209. 
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Britain’s role in the Military Build-up of Iran in the seventies 
 
As presented by Fain
44
, the Security Construct was based on a 
framework that was to encourage the regional actors to cooperate and 
resolve their disputes so that any possible conflict could be resolved 
through political action. In the absence of British or American troops in the 
region, the role of regional arbiter was assigned to Iran. To realize this, Iran 
had to be strong enough to discourage any conflict in the area
45
. The 
decision to equip Iran for this purpose is closely linked to the assessment 
that especially the United Kingdom had sufficient influence on Iran to 
control this „implanted force‟.  
Yet, the role of the United States in this area is better documented 
than that of the United Kingdom. As we know, the US sold F-4 Phantom 
aircrafts (Israel being the only other state in the region that was in 
possession of this type of aircraft) to Iran
46
. And according to Alexander 
Moens, the Nixon administration issued Iran with a “carte blanche”47 so 
that the Shah could acquire any weapon system he desired
48
. 
Much of the British role in Iran‟s military build-up is still covered 
by classified documents, so there is little hard material, like contracts, 
available that can be used for an analysis. However, clues may not so much 
be found in declassified defence contracts as well as in the correspondence 
between the British government and the one in Iran with regard to the 
cancellation of contracts after the Islamic Revolution. 
When the Shah was forced to leave Iran, a power struggle began 
which was won by the Ayatollah Khomeini
49
. The actions of the new 
                                                             
44 See Taylor Fain, op. cit., p.178 
45 Jacob C. Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 115. 
46 Joe Stork, James Paul, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
47 Alexander Moens, “President Carter‟s Advisers and the Fall of the Shah”, in Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 2, 1991, p. 214. 
48 Ibidem. 
49 Heather L. Wagner, The Creation of the Modern Middle East: Iran, Philadelphia, 
Chelsea House Publishers, 2009, pp. 71-72. 
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government were designed to undo as much of the Iranians monarch‟s 
policies as possible, including limiting the amount of weapons that Iran was 
purchasing. It is in the list of contracts enclosed in the telegrams to London, 
announcing the Iranian desire to cancel the contracts that valuable 
information can be found of what the British government was selling to 
Iran. The contracts cancelled were not only for tanks, armoured vehicles, 
support ships, hovercrafts, spare parts and ammunition for these types of 
weapons, but also for consultancy and construction of naval bases
50
.  
Interestingly, in documents about discussions within the Cabinet 
Office for almost a year after the cancelation of the contracts, it is 
mentioned that Britain still remained the second largest defence equipment 
provider to Iran
51
. The connection between the two documents allows us to 
understand Britain‟s importance to Iran as an arms supplier. Not only is the 
United Kingdom the second largest weapons supplier to Iran, but the 
contracts between the two cover all military sectors and are not restricted to 
just equipment, spare parts or ammunition.  
In fact this is highly consistent with what one would expect as a 
result of the Security Construct. The British focused in the period between 
1968 and 1979 on a broad military build-up of Iran. By contrast, they were 
not supporting any systematic military build-up of other countries in the 
region, such as Iraq, as is for instance demonstrated by the following 
telegram of the British Embassy in Iraq:  
 
“The reputation we have gained over the years of being an 
unreliable supplier in that we appear to the Iraqis to be very 
selective about what we will and will not supply. They 
claim, with some justice, that the French, for example, are 
much more forthcoming and that they therefore see little 
                                                             
50 FCO08/3383, Future of Defence Contracts with Iran (Policy) Part A, 1979, London, 
National Archives, doc. 36a; also see DEFE24/1406 Defence Sales to Iran following the 
change of the regime, 1978, London, National Archives, doc. E11A. 
51 Official Group on Iran: meetings 1-5, papers 1-3 (1979); meetings 1-12, papers 1-8, 
1980, London, National Archives, p. 40. 
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alternative to seeking their requirements from them [the 
French] rather than us”52. 
 
A selective policy with regard to arms sales to other countries in the 
region is also highly consistent with the underlying principles of the 
Security Construct. Thus, it aimed at making only one country strong 
enough in order to discourage conflicts in the area.  
Summing up, the British role in the military build-up of Iran in the 
seventies has remained underexposed in literature, probably due to lack of 
hard evidence, but there are enough indications to conclude that Britain‟s 
role in the military build-up of Iran was pretty much according to the 
Security‟s Construct‟s plan.   
 
The Collapse of the Security Construct  
 
The western support that the Shah was enjoying under the Security 
Construct did not only manifest itself in his foreign policy, but also 
domestically. At the same time that the monarch was consolidating his 
regime
53
 he was also modernizing and „westernizing‟ Iran in an accelerated 
pace
54
. 
These domestic reforms, imposed by the Shah, represent the 
beginning of the end for the Security Construct. The monarch‟s policy of 
modernization upset multiple segments of Iran‟s population55. Once the 
„Carter doctrine‟ was signed, Iran‟s citizens started to ask for more 
freedom
56
. Faced with unrest, the Shah turns to his western allies for advice. 
Moens argues that because the American administration provided the Shah 
                                                             
52 FCO08/3717, U.K. Arms & Defence Sales to Iraq Part B, 1980, London, National 
Archives, doc. 129. 
53 Heather L. Wagner, op. cit., pp. 42-45. 
54 Masoud Kheirabadi, Iran (Modern World Nations), Philadelphia, Chelsea House 
Publishers, 2003, pp. 53-54. 
55 Ervand Abrahamian, op. cit., p.139-143. 
56 Ibidem,  p. 159. 
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with inadequate advice, the monarch embarked on a strange carrot-stick 
policy (on the one hand granting freedoms and on the other cracking down 
on protesters hard), a policy that not only proved ineffective but even 
inflamed the situation further
57
. The situation became so grave that in 
January 1979, the Shah was forced to leave Iran
58
 which opened the way for 
the Islamic Revolution.  
The government left by the Shah was unable to restore stability. 
Although the Bakhtiar administration tried to prevent Ayatollah Khomeini 
from returning to Iran, the religious leader arrived in Tehran and was 
greeted by large masses of people
59
. Once he returned he imposed, through 
referendum, a new constitution
60
, thus establishing the new Islamic 
Republic of Iran.  
The internal struggle for power continued until the Hostage Crisis, 
which Khomeini used to rally the population around his cause against the 
United States
61. Due to the United States‟ decision to allow the Shah to 
enter the United States for medical treatment, on the 4
th
 of November 1979, 
a group of students assaulted the American Embassy in Tehran and took the 
diplomatic corps hostage
62
. This generated a 444 days crisis between the 
newly formed Republic of Iran and the USA, prompting the United States 
to sever diplomatic ties with Tehran and impose an arms and oil embargo
63
. 
The embargo from the United States against Iran left the Islamic 
Republic without its most important arms suppliers. Furthermore, when the 
American consultants left Iran, they committed a series of sabotages, taking 
with them the avionics of the Iranian air force, leaving the Iranian Republic 
                                                             
57 Alexander Moens, op. cit., p. 220. 
58 Heather L. Wagner, op. cit., p. 61. 
59 Daniel Harmon, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini: Spiritual Leaders and Thinkers, 
Philadelphia, Chelsea House Publishers, 2005, pp. 51-53. 
60 Ervand Abrahamian, op. cit., pp. 162-165. 
61 Ibidem,, p. 176. 
62 David P. Houghton, US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 50-55. 
63 Ibidem, p. 106; also see Steven R. Ward, op. cit., p. 245.  
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unable to deploy their planes
64
. Thus, the strong and well-armed Iran that 
was supposed to counterbalance its neighbours was turned weak, militarily 
unorganized and unable to deploy its forces. In fact, this triggered the Iran-
Iraq war.  
Pelletiere observes that although the Iranian armed forces were 
already dysfunctional immediately after the Shah left (lacking central 
coordination)
65
, Iraq was not ready at that time to engage in a conflict
66
. 
However, the Hostage Crisis convinced the Iraqi leadership that the balance 
of power between the two countries had shifted
67
 due to the fact that Iran 
was not only unorganized but now also lacked the weapons to defend itself. 
When Her Majesty‟s Government decided to close their Embassy in Tehran 
due to the instability and insecurity generated by the Hostage Crisis, despite 
maintaining diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic open
68
, the 
second pillar of the Security Construct –British influence– was starting to 
fail.  
Within a year after the above mentioned events, the Iran-Iraq war 
started. Caused by Saddam Hussein‟s desire to take control of the Shatt-al-
Arab
69
, to eliminate a regime hostile to his
70
 and to become the leader of the 
Arab world
71
, the Iraqi invasion proves that Iran was no longer able to 
discourage the use of military power by its neighbours and that neither 
American nor British influence was instrumental anymore to solving 
regional problems in different ways. This meant a total collapse of the 
Security Construct. 
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By design, the Security Construct was based on a strengthened Iran 
and British and American influence on Iran in order to control the 
„implanted‟ force. In reality, the Security Construct appeared to be based, 
for a large part, on the position of the Shah.  
British action during de final months of the Shah suggests that 
indeed a post-Shah era was evaluated. As British influence was extended to 
the leaders of the opposition, the British designed a contingency plan which 
involved identifying and contacting the main leader(s) of the opposition that 
would be friendly toward the west
72
. Although the British still hoped that 
the Shah would resolve the situation
73
, this contingency plan was meant to 
keep Britain in a good position with a possible different government and 
maintain their contracts and interests. These contracts included (but were 
not limited to) the sale of military equipment towards Iran. Thus, securing 
good relations with a possible opposition government would put the United 
Kingdom in a good position to continue its contribution to the Gulf‟s 
Security.  
However, the last discussion between the British ambassador and 
the Shah already indicates that the contingency plan envisioned by the 
British had limited chances of success. Lord Parsons‟s notes in his telegram 
to London that: 
 
“I was struck by the fact that he had obviously 
relinquished all power. We had some discussion of practical 
matters but his whole manner was that of a man who was 
talking about past events which no longer had personal 
relevance to him. 
For example, he said that „I wonder whether Iran will 
go ahead with the purchase of your Shir tanks‟. I said that we 
were doing our best to hang on but that it was a question of 
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money. He laughed and said in a detached way that Iran had 
no money and could not help.  
We also discussed the future foreign policy of any 
Iranian government. Again, his manner was that of a man 
who was prepared to take a mild but detached interest. We 
agreed that Iran‟s foreign policy was likely to be more 
„Middle Eastern‟ in terms of regional problems and attitudes 
towards problems of importance to the third world in 
general”74. 
 
This discussion with the Shah already contradicts British 
expectations that the new government would be inclined to maintain the 
same level of engagement
75
 and the Shah‟s understanding of the situation 
seems pretty accurate. The return of Khomeini (the only leader with which 
the British could not establish dialogue)
76
 shifted Iran‟s policy exactly 
along the lines that the Shah indicated
77
 and within 8 months after this 
discussion, the tank contracts were cancelled.  
Equally relevant is the miscalculation regarding the importance of 
the Shah for the armed forces. As Pelletiere argues, the monarch‟s role 
appeared to be of such vital importance for the armed forces, that once he 
departed from Teheran, they were completely unable to coordinate 
anymore
78
. 
Then, the Hostage Crisis forced the final shift in the British policy 
towards Iran. Before this crisis, the British position was still to focus on 
maintaining stability in Iran, but after the assault on the American Embassy 
the British were forced to take action to aid the United States in their efforts 
to release the hostages. This presented a dilemma, as the British 
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government had to choose between maintaining good relations with Iran 
and aiding their most important ally, the US. As the British felt obliged to 
choose the side of the US, they lost most of their influence on Iran. 
As discussed, the British influence on Iran and the Shah was based 
on economic, political and military dependencies of the latter. When these 
dependencies were simply denied by the new Iranian government, British 
policymaking had to return to a dilemma with regard to their own interests.  
Obviously, British interests were damaged by the nationalization of 
the National Iranian Oil Company by the new Islamic regime. The regime 
cancelled the Consortium Agreement of 1954 and all regulations associated 
with it, causing an exodus of foreign employees and thus leaving the 
industry in the hands of domestic employees
79
.  
But British interests were also to be viewed in relation to its allies. 
Within the Cabinet Office a debate was started about the value of Iran for 
the British economy vis-à-vis the obligation that they might have towards 
the US. It was stated that: 
 
 “These factors need to be balanced against the right of the 
Americans to look to us for all possible support and our 
interest in helping avoid any risk of them becoming resentful 
towards their allies or reckless in their policy towards Iran if 
helpful advice and support is not forthcoming”80. 
 
In the end, the decision was made to fully support the United States 
in demanding the release of their diplomatic corps, despite the important 
implications this could have on the United Kingdom‟s economic interests. 
According to Cabinet estimations, the potential loss of contracts might 
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amount to a value of £150 million for the first year and £300 million per 
year subsequently as various other exports to Iran might be affected
81
. 
Next, the British support of the United States was substantiated by 
„administrative‟ delays in arms supplying (effectively an arms embargo) 
and other economic sanctions in order to secure the release of the hostages. 
As stated by the British government: 
 
“The MOD have contracted to supply some tanks spares and 
ammunition to Iran. Ministers agreed in June 1979 that, 
subject to satisfactory financial arrangements being made, 
these deliveries should proceed. Appropriate payments of 
sums due have now been made and necessary letters of 
credit opened and the MOD is ready to recommence supply. 
No spares and ammunition have been supplied since the 
hostages were taken in early November and Defence and 
FCO Ministers have agreed that for the time being no 
supplies should be declared for shipment and that 
administrative delays should be offered as the excuse if one 
is called for. This is the current position.  
An overt Arms Embargo would do no immediate damage to 
the Iranian Government but the Armed Forces are eager to 
obtain delivery of spares and ammunitions which they must 
have if they are to be used as effective instruments of law 
and order. They can therefore be expected to press for 
supplies in due course”82. 
 
These actions, that clearly and ostensibly placed the United 
Kingdom in the United States camp, together with the growing instability of 
the situation in Teheran, made it necessary for London to decide to close 
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the British Embassy in Teheran. Still, diplomatic relations with the Islamic 
Republic were maintained and the Iranian Embassy in London remained 
open
83
. 
As none of the British actions had the required impact it is apparent 
that British influence over the new Khomeini administration was very 
limited if not non-existent, and even more so after the closure of the British 
Embassy.  
Signs that the Iranian Islamic Revolution was also starting to 
destabilize the region were coming in soon after. In April that year, Lord 
Carrington required the stations (in Teheran and Bagdad) to immediately 
report if they “have indications that British shipping using the Shatt al-Arab 
or other Northern Gulf ports could be endangered by current hostilities”84. 
The hostilities Lord Carrington referred to were the first signs of the 
upcoming Iraqi invasion of Iran later that year (September). Although this 
communication in itself is perfectly normal, it also clearly shows the shift in 
British concerns. Similarly, when later that year the war between Iran and 
Iraq was indeed threatening free shipping in the region, the British 
government reengaged militarily in the area deploying two war ships: HMS 
Coventry
85
 and HMS Alacrity
86
. They were instructed not to intervene in 
the war but to protect its interests and, as part of an international effort 
together with the US and the French, to guard and rescue any civilian ships 
caught in the crossfire of the conflict
87
. 
The combination of a war and an ongoing arms embargo to one of the 
belligerents (Iran) further limited whatever possibilities were left to 
influence the situation, as is shown by the following telegram that 
circulated inside the Foreign and Commonwealth Office:    
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“In deciding what items to supply the Secretary of State will 
need to bear in mind our obligation as a neutral state to treat 
Iraq and Iran impartially. We are not obliged to prevent the 
export of arms or ammunition or „anything which can be use 
to an army‟ (Article 7 of the 1907 Hague Convention on 
Neutral Powers and Persons in Land Warfare). But if we 
choose (for whatever reason) to restrict the supply of any of 
those things we must apply our restrictions impartially to 
both belligerents (Article 8)”88. 
 
Summing up, the sequence of events not only led to the collapse of 
the Security Construct, but also to serious damage to British interests. The 
Hostage Crisis forced Hear Majesty‟s Government to openly support the 
US and participate in the embargo. That embargo continuing after the Iran-
Iraq started made it impossible to intervene in the war, even if they had 
wanted to. The remaining position for the British was to defend their own 
interests, wherever possible.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This study makes a case for a much more prominent British role in 
the Security Construct for the Gulf after the British withdrawal of 1968, 
than usually is perceived in literature.  
The Security Construct was an American initiative prompted by the 
void left by the British after their decision to withdraw all of their troops 
East of Suez. The inability of the US to fill this void themselves brought 
them to design a system rooted in the concept of a „Pax Britannica‟. 
Stability in the region was believed to be achievable by balancing local 
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military power and sufficient western influence on local actors, especially 
on the one with the policing role. In this design, pro-western Iran fulfilled 
the military role and British influence was deemed to be sufficient to 
achieve the required balance. Western controlled stability in the region 
could then be instrumental in blocking the USSR in this part of the world. 
Although reluctant at first, the British decided to participate in this 
construct. It meant a transformation rather than a withdrawal from the 
„Global Role‟, at least for this part of the world. Seemingly it came with 
less risk and fewer costs.  
The construct held strong for almost a decade, but when it was put 
to a serious test in 1979 it showed a fatal weakness that, apparently, was not 
accounted for. The Islamic Revolution, led by the one person (Ayatollah 
Khomeini) that was not susceptible to western influence, erased the 
foundation of the construct by simply ignoring Iran‟s dependency on its 
western allies, even if that was not in its best interest.   
It could be argued of course that the security construct was leaning 
too much on the position of one person, the Shah. But this in itself was not 
uncommon and the US and the UK had extensive experience in dealing 
with „weaknesses‟ of this type. The element that surprised all parties 
involved was religious radicalism that did not answer to known western 
logic.   
The protests of 1978 and 1979 signified a desire for change in Iran 
that even the Shah was clearly seeing. But it turned into unprecedented 
change in the hands of the Ayatollah Khomeini as the actions of the new 
government were designed to undo as much of the Iranians monarch‟s 
policies as possible, including limiting the amount of weapons that Iran was 
purchasing. 
His reforms, therefore, were not only blocking western influence in 
Iran but also affecting Iran‟s economic and military base. And his decision 
to support the action of the students that assaulted the American Embassy 
may have been instrumental in eliminating internal opposition but, by 
violating one of the most sacred rules of international relations, the sanctity 
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of the diplomatic missions, he alienated Iran from its former allies and 
triggered an arms and oil embargo against the newly formed Islamic 
Republic of Iran that severely implicated the country.  
Thus, through this decision to „hold the United States hostage‟ 
Khomeini brought the Security Construct to an end and with it stability in 
the region, as soon after became apparent with the start of the Iraq-Iran war. 
When we take Mr Steven‟s view “that the involvement of American and 
British technological and industrial expertise was such that no Government 
would wish to throw out the Anglo-American overnight”89 as representative 
for western logic, then it is apparent that the chain of events in Iran was not 
anticipated and not included in any scenario that the Security Construct 
should have catered to.  
Unfortunately, what was seen as impossible was exactly what 
happened and it did not only end the Security Construct and with it British 
influence in Iran, but it also meant severe damage to Britain‟s interests, as 
all of its oil related assets were confiscated, arms sales were cancelled and 
all other economic relations between the UK and Iran were severely limited 
by the Hostage Crisis, the skirmishes and, later, the full war between Iran 
and Iraq.  
Did Britain make a mistake by giving in to the US pressure to 
participate in the Security Construct? That is a question that each and all of 
the US allies had and have to find an answer to. In this case, relinquishing 
their involvement in the Gulf would have gone against the desires of 
Britain‟s most important ally, the United States of America. Such an action 
might have had severe implications on British overall interests. If the larger 
context of the Cold war is taken into consideration, the negative 
implications of a refusal to comply with the American design might as well 
have overridden the negative effects of the failure of the Security Construct.  
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Interestingly enough, one of the Security Construct‟s objectives was 
realized even after its collapse. As seen in the beginning of this study, the 
revolutionaries considered the USSR worse than both the British and 
Americans put together. As a consequence, it is not surprising that in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the Security Construct, the USSR was unable to 
bring Iran in its sphere of influence.  
Taking everything into consideration, the paradoxical message that 
started this study can now be understood. As the revolution was directed 
against the Shah and the monarch was associated with the west (in this case 
both the United States and Britain), it is natural that Iranian frustration 
would manifest towards the Shah‟s allies. Moreover, British involvement in 
the Security Construct allowed the UK to maintain influence in Iran‟s 
internal policy. As a consequence their inclusion in the list is not only the 
result of historical domination of the Gulf, but a continuing presence (under 
a different form) in the internal workings of the Gulf. 
Even more relevant, although an American construct was governing 
the security of the Gulf, British heritage made the revolutionaries unable to 
decide which power would be able to develop a stronger influence on Iran, 
putting both the British and the Americans on the same place. As a 
consequence, an argument can be made for the importance of the British for 
the construct and the level of influence they had. Furthermore, even after 
the Islamic Revolution, the two western states were viewed with the same 
mistrust until the US allowed the Shah to briefly stay in the US, pushing 
Iranian resentment towards the US over the limit.  
Looking at the failure of the Security Construct from a British 
perspective adds to the understanding of the Islamic Revolution and allows 
us to look at events from another dimension. Within the span of a year, Iran 
has managed to transform itself from the west‟s most important ally to its 
worst archenemy. This would naturally passion relations between Iran and 
the west.  
However, seeing how, at the moment of its birth, the Islamic 
Republic had tense relation with the west, an argument can be made that 
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this would be translated within its political culture and make any 
rapprochement more difficult. Last year, the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
the West signed an important accord. Sings of a more open Iran are 
emerging, arguably bringing the two sides closer and allowing some 
chances for rapprochement. Seeing how opinions regarding this landmark 
accord are divided, these new perspectives on the founding moments of the 
Islamic Republic and its relations with the West are not only welcome but 
vital to understand and bridge the divide between the two sides.  
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